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Abstract
Assessment in higher education requires multifaceted instruments to capture 
competency structures and development. We investigate two aspects of competen-
cies of pre-service mathematics teachers: a certain aspect of mathematical abili-
ties (critical thinking with respect to mathematical problem situations) and epis-
temological beliefs (assessed by both belief position and belief justifi cation). We 
investigated 463 students from two universities with respect to both aspects of 
competencies. We show that students’ belief position and justifi cation are inde-
pendent and can be assessed independently. Whereas belief position is not corre-
lated with the number of the students’ semesters, their course of studies, and their 
mathematical abilities, belief justifi cation is indeed correlated with these factors.
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Mathematische Kompetenzen in der Hochschulbildung: 
Epistemologische Überzeugungen und kritisches 
Denken in verschiedenen Zweigen der Lehrerausbildung
Zusammenfassung
Leistungsmessung in der Hochschulbildung benötigt facettenreiche Instrumente, 
um Kompetenzstrukturen und -entwicklung erfassen zu können. Wir unter suchen 
zwei Aspekte von Kompetenzen von Studierenden des Lehramts Mathe matik: ei-
nen bestimmten Aspekt mathematischer Fähigkeiten (kritisches Denken mit Bezug 
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auf mathematische Problemsituationen) und epistemologische Über zeugungen 
(wobei sowohl die Position als auch die Begründung der Über zeugungen erfasst 
werden). Wir haben Daten von 463 Studierenden von zwei Universitäten zu bei-
den Kompetenzaspekten erhoben und ausgewertet. Wir zeigen, dass die Positionen 
und Begründungen der studentischen Überzeugungen unabhängig vonein-
ander sind und unabhängig voneinander erhoben werden können. Während 
die Über zeugungsposition nicht korreliert ist mit der Anzahl der Semester der 
Studierenden, ihrer Studienwahl und ihren mathematischen Fähigkeiten, zeigen 
sich bei der Begründung der Überzeugungen tatsächlich Korrelationen mit die-
sen Faktoren.
Schlagworte
Epistemologische Überzeugungen; kritisches Denken; mathematische Kom pe-
tenzen 
1.  Introduction
Teacher education addresses a wide spectrum of knowledge, skills, and beliefs 
which are currently regarded as aspects of the broader construct of teacher com-
petency (Shulman, 1986; Krauss et al., 2008; Blömeke, Kaiser, & Lehmann, 2008). 
When focusing on those competencies that are specifi c for the teachers’ teach-
ing subject, various models of subject matter knowledge and pedagogical con-
tent knowledge are discussed (e.g., for mathematics Hill, Shilling, & Ball, 2004; 
Depaepe, Verschaff el, & Kelchtermans, 2013). The fact that knowledge and beliefs 
have an impact on teaching quality and learning outcome (Baumert et al., 2010; 
Voss, Kleickmann, Kunter, & Hachfeld, 2013) is widely acknowledged. However, 
the evidence on how both aspects are connected and how they develop during 
teacher education still mainly draws on the evidence from case studies and is in 
need for the development of systematic measurement approaches (Blömeke, Zlatin-
Troitschanskaia, Kuhn, & Fege, 2013). With respect to mathematical knowledge, 
existing instruments mostly strive to measure the amount of knowledge that has 
been accumulated during university curriculum (Döhrmann, Kaiser, & Blömeke, 
2014; Krauss et al., 2008). With respect to mathematical beliefs, one can fi nd a 
broad spectrum of conceptualizations and instruments which produce partly con-
tradictory fi ndings (see section 1 in the theoretical background). Studies that report 
on development of knowledge and beliefs during teacher education typically draw 
on cross-sectional data and investigate the two aspects independently (Voss et al., 
2013; Kraus et al., 2008; Kleickmann et al., 2013).
In our approach, we wish to contribute to the eff orts to measure the develop-
ment of mathematical beliefs and knowledge during the fi rst years of universi-
ty study. We are emphasizing two aspects: Firstly, we assess both aspects, beliefs 
and knowledge, simultaneously so that we can answer questions with respect to 
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the connection between the developments in both areas. Secondly, we assess both 
aspects in a specifi c manner: Our focus is not the accumulation of subject matter 
knowledge, but the growing ability to fl exibly solve mathematical problems. Also, 
we assess mathematical beliefs not by an approach that considers certain beliefs to-
ward mathematics as naïve and others as sophisticated, but we rather diff erenti-
ate between the belief position (sometimes called belief orientation: whether math-
ematical knowledge is considered to be rather certain or uncertain) and the belief 
justifi cation (how thoroughly the beliefs are supported by reasons and arguments).
For both purposes we developed instruments that will be described in the fol-
lowing sections. We applied the instruments in several populations of students 
from diff erent systems of mathematics teacher education. The intention was to test 
whether the fi ndings can be interpreted consistently with the goals and the struc-
ture of the diff erent systems and whether one can fi nd overall structures connect-
ing knowledge and beliefs at diff erent points of teacher education. 
Since the aim of the study is not an exhaustive defi nition of teacher competen-
cy or the test of a broad model, as do many large-scale-studies, we concentrate on 
certain dimensions which we consider central and relevant for a better understand-
ing of the competence structure and development in teacher education. 
2.  Theoretical Background
2.1  Epistemological beliefs
With respect to the belief aspect, we focus on epistemological beliefs, which are 
beliefs concerning the nature of knowledge and knowing. Epistemological beliefs 
are a topic of psychology and (mathematics) education that has received a grow-
ing interest among researchers in recent years. The impact of epistemological be-
liefs on gaining and processing knowledge as well as on teaching and learning in 
general are widely recognized (Buehl & Alexander, 2006; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). 
Furthermore, students’ epistemological beliefs are aff ected by their teachers’ epis-
temological beliefs and their teaching style (e.g., Brownlee & Berthelsen, 2008).
Most researchers agree that there are several dimensions of those beliefs (cf. 
Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) and that learners can pass several stages of development in 
each of those dimensions during their school and university education. Such a de-
velopment is often considered to start with fi xed, absolutistic beliefs and can reach 
fl exible, cross-linked, evaluativistic beliefs. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) present an 
extensive review of developmental models of epistemological beliefs, stating that 
most researchers agree on a hierarchical sequence of stages that describes the de-
velopment of such beliefs. However, there is no consensus on such stages or even 
on the number of stages.
However, the theoretical foundation as well as the empirical research on episte-
mological beliefs are heterogeneous (Bromme, Kienhues, & Stahl, 2008). Recently, 
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beliefs are recognized as rather context-specifi c than general which should be taken 
into account in a more systematic way (Hofer, 2000). Furthermore recent studies 
suggest that it is not suffi  cient to solely capture the general position of beliefs (e.g., 
“mathematical knowledge is certain vs. uncertain”) but also the context in which 
statements on beliefs arise (Greene & Yu, 2014). 
In addition to these theoretical issues, there are methodological issues regard-
ing the instruments used by a majority of the studies in both mathematics educa-
tion and psychology as those instruments mainly consist of closed question formats 
(Duell & Schommer-Aikins, 2001). In psychological research, the most common 
method of measuring epistemological beliefs is the use of questionnaires that build 
on Schommer’s (1990) questionnaire, which uses Likert scale items (cf. Hofer, 
2000). In mathematics education, studies which use closed items are also very 
widespread. For example, the COACTIV study (Baumert et al., 2009, pp. 63 ff .), 
building on Grigutsch, Raatz, and Törner. (1998), used questions with a four-
point Likert scale (is not correct/is rather not correct/is rather correct/is correct). 
Example items are: “Mathematics is characterized by rigor, namely a rigor in defi -
nitions and formal strictness in the mathematical argumentation.” or “Mathematics 
is a logically consistent thought structure with precisely defi ned terms and unique-
ly provable statements.” In this line of research, the expressed beliefs (e.g., “mathe-
matics is a rigorous science”) which we call belief position is assumed to be related 
to the justifi cation of the belief. For example, beliefs on the certainty of knowledge 
are regarded to be absolutistic and infl exible, whereas beliefs on the uncertain-
ty of knowledge are interpreted as evaluativistic and sophisticated (e.g., Hofer & 
Pintrich, 1997; Schommer, 1998; Muis, 2004).
Stahl (2011, p. 41 f.) argues that there has been little success in developing a 
questionnaire with strong reliability and validity. The main problem according to 
Stahl is the unstable factor structure of the instruments; he identifi es another prob-
lematic aspect in items which are often indirectly related to epistemological beliefs. 
Muis (2004) points out additional diffi  culties with questionnaires in their eff ective-
ness and in their capability of measuring general as well as domain-specifi c episte-
mological beliefs.
To overcome these theoretical and methodological issues, in an extension of 
the previous measuring procedures, we tried a diff erent approach to assess episte-
mological beliefs. We believe that at least for the domain of mathematics, the be-
lief position is not tied to its justifi cation in such a strong way as the psychologi-
cal research suggests (see the methodological issues above). For example, a person 
might hold the position that mathematical knowledge is uncertain and he or she 
might have more sophisticated arguments (e.g., the possibility of errors in the re-
view and publication process and examples of published but erroneous proofs) or 
less sophisticated arguments (“Every knowledge is uncertain. I do not believe in 
absolute truth.”) to back up his or her belief position. This view of justifi cation is 
in line with Stahl’s (2011) theory on cognitive fl exibility and Bromme et al. (2008, 
p. 432) who describe sophisticated epistemological beliefs “as those beliefs which 
allow for context-sensitive judgments about knowledge claims.”
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In a qualitative interview study (Rott, Leuders, & Stahl, 2014), we could show 
that both belief positions – mathematical knowledge is certain vs. uncertain – can 
be held with sophisticated as well as naïve and infl exible arguments. Therefore, we 
strived for a quantitative instrument to capture not only individuals’ belief posi-
tions but also the ways their belief positions are justifi ed to obtain a more valid 
picture of peoples’ beliefs. Based on the interview questions, we developed a ques-
tionnaire with open-ended questions instead of Likert-scale responses which is a 
precursor of the instrument described below and investigated mathematics pre-ser-
vice teachers with respect to their epistemological beliefs on the certainty of math-
ematical knowledge. (We also investigated their mathematical abilities; see the 
paragraph on Mathematical critical thinking.) In a questionnaire study with 215 
pre-service teachers (Rott, Leuders, & Stahl, 2015), we could show that episte-
mological beliefs can be measured in two dimensions – belief position and belief 
justifi cation – and that these dimensions are independent of each other which at 
least partly contradicts previous research (see above). In our research on mathe-
matics-related epistemological beliefs, these two belief dimensions were not relat-
ed. Participants judged mathematical knowledge as either certain or uncertain ei-
ther infl exibly or sophisticatedly. In that specifi c group, the relative frequency of 
sophisticated answers was higher for fourth semester students than for fi rst semes-
ter students, indicating an increase of refl ection on beliefs in this pseudo-longitu-
dinal survey.
2.2  Mathematical critical thinking
As a second aspect of mathematics-related competency, we focus on a dimension 
that relates to mathematical knowledge and its fl exible application. It is not the 
goal of our study to comprehensively measure mathematical knowledge in teach-
er education (such as Baumert et al., 2010; Blömeke et al., 2008; Voss et al., 2013). 
Instead, we want to tap on an aspect of knowledge which refl ects the fl exibility of 
students to deal with unknown mathematical situations and which is rather inde-
pendent of the mere accumulation of content knowledge. We assume that this type 
of mathematical fl exibility is more developed in the same individuals that also ar-
gue more fl exibly when asked to justify their beliefs. This assumption would be in 
line with the concept of a refl ective mind as introduced below.
The instrument we developed in order to assess this aspect of mathemat-
ical knowledge was inspired by certain arguments from the research on criti-
cal thinking. Facione (1990, p. 3) “understand[s] critical thinking to be purpose-
ful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, 
and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, 
criteriological, or contextual considerations upon which that judgment is based.” 
Though many diff erent conceptualizations of critical thinking exist (e.g., in philos-
ophy, psychology, and education) the following abilities are commonly agreed upon 
(cf. Lai, 2011, p. 9): analyzing arguments, claims, or evidence; making inferences 
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using inductive or deductive reasoning; judging or evaluation and making deci-
sions; or solving problems.
For the purpose of our study it is necessary to determine a narrower focus with-
in this broad construct, and it seems reasonable to refer to a model by Stanovich 
and Stanovich (2010, p. 210 ff .). They build on dual process theory in which cog-
nitive activities are distinguished into a fast, automatic, emotional, subconscious 
(type 1) and a slow, eff ortful, logical, conscious (type 2) subset of minds (see 
Kahneman, 2011, for details). Stanovich and Stanovich locate critical thinking with-
in a tripartite model of thinking, an extension of dual process theory, by further 
diff erentiating conscious thinking into algorithmic and refl ective thinking, (see 
Figure 1). Within this model, they interpret critical thinking as a process of moni-
toring of problem solving activities: Only with the refl ective mind, issues of ratio-
nality come into play, assessing the eff orts of the algorithmic mind. For instance, 
with this construct it can be explained why people with equal abilities in algorith-
mic thinking diff er in solving complex tasks (cf. ibid., p. 212 ff .).
Within this model, an indicator of critical thinking is the ability to monitor or 
evaluate problem solving processes with the refl ective mind and to take more com-
plex or less self-evident aspects of a problem into consideration.
Figure 1:   The tripartite model of thinking by Stanovich and Stanovich (2010, p. 210); the 
broken horizontal line represents the key distinction in dual process theory.
A typical situation, which demands critical thinking to override algorithmic math-
ematical solutions by refl ective and evaluative processes, is the paradigmatic bat-
and-ball task by Kahneman and Frederick (2002): “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in 
total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The spon-
taneous, algorithmically or even autonomously produced answer is $0.10. People 
who think critically would question this answer and realize that the ball should cost 
$0.05, whereas people who do not use critical thinking do not evaluate their fi rst 
thoughts. This type of situation is typical for many mathematical problems and will 
be used as a model task for the construction of an instrument to measure critical 
mathematical thinking.
As said before, the conceptualizations of mathematical beliefs and knowledge 
described above are far from exhaustive with respect to mathematical competency. 
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However, we regard them as suffi  ciently relevant to refl ect central dimensions and 
to investigate their interconnection and development.
In the aforementioned study with 215 pre-service teachers (Rott et al., 2015), 
we additionally investigated the pre-service teachers’ mathematical abilities (de-
fi ned as critical thinking with respect to mathematical problem situations). We 
could show that the ability to think critically and the level of critical thinking does 
not depend on belief position but goes along with the level of justifi cation of the 
epistemic judgments expressed by pre-service teachers. Also, this pseudo-longitu-
dinal survey hinted at an increase of the ability to think critically as the fourth se-
mester students outperformed the fi rst semester students signifi cantly.
3.  Goals and Research Questions
The preceding study (as described in the previous section) was restricted to only 
200 pre-service teachers from one university (Rott et al., 2015). Therefore, these 
results are considered as preliminary and will be tested with a larger number of 
pre-service teachers from two universities. By conducting a more comprehensive 
study we intend to a) replicate the previous results, to b) to increase their validity 
by applying them to diff erent types of teacher education, and to c) test their usabil-
ity as instruments for the evaluation of the outcome of tertiary education. 
The research questions that guide the previous study and the one presented 
here are: 
• Can the students’ fl exibility in belief justifi cation be validly distinguished from 
their belief position?
• Is there a connection to the knowledge domain, more precisely their critical 
thinking skills operationalized as the fl exibility with which students approach 
mathematical problems? 
• Are there diff erences in the beliefs and the critical thinking skills between stu-
dents of diff erent numbers of semesters and diff erent educational programs?
These questions are addressed by the following hypotheses that will be tested with-
in the study at hand.
• (H1) Hypothesis 1: The two theoretical dimensions of epistemological be-
liefs – belief position (certain vs. uncertain) and belief justifi cation (infl exible 
vs. sophisticated) – are empirically distinguishable.
This will be tested by means of a belief questionnaire with open-ended items in 
the same manner as in Rott et al. (2015). The independence of the two dimensions 
should be true for the whole population as well as for all relevant subgroups (i.e., 
low or high number of semesters and diff ering educational programs at the univer-
sities).
• (H2) Hypothesis 2: For the distribution of judgments regarding the certainty 
of mathematical knowledge, i.e., the belief positions (certain vs. uncertain), we 
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do not expect signifi cant diff erences between the relevant subgroups (i.e. low or 
high number of semesters and educational programs at the universities).
However, we do expect signifi cant diff erences between the relevant subgroups for 
the distribution of the participants’ belief justifi cation (infl exible vs. sophisticated):
• (H3) Hypothesis 3: Students with a higher number of semesters argue in a more 
sophisticated way than students with a lower number of semesters. We also ex-
pect students with more mathematics-related content in their university edu-
cation (upper secondary teachers) to argue more sophisticatedly than students 
with less mathematics-related content (primary and lower secondary teachers).
The fl exible application of mathematical knowledge had to be measured as in-
dependently as possible of the knowledge of certain mathematical concepts learned 
in specifi c mathematics courses. To refl ect this, we conceptualized mathematical 
abilities as critical thinking during problem solving. This ability should increase 
during university education, with a steeper increase in students in strands of teach-
er education that require more mathematics courses. Regarding the scores in the 
test on mathematical critical thinking, we anticipate signifi cant diff erences between 
the subgroups:
• (H4) Hypothesis 4: Students with a higher number of semesters score higher 
than students with a lower number of semesters. Students with more mathe-
matics-related content in their university education (upper secondary teachers) 
score higher than students with less mathematics-related content (primary and 
lower secondary teachers).
The assumed independence of the belief position from the justifi cation with which 
beliefs are backed-up is refl ected in the following hypothesis:
• (H5) Hypothesis 5: Regarding the relation of epistemological beliefs and critical 
thinking, there are no signifi cant diff erences of critical thinking scores between 
the relevant subgroups sorted by their belief position (certain vs. uncertain).
The belief and the knowledge dimensions of our test both refl ect certain kinds of 
sophistication and refl ection as described in the tripartite model. Although we do 
not propose a model of common cognitive processes, we assume that there is a 
substantial correlation between these dimensions. 
• (H6) Hypothesis 6: Regarding the relation of epistemological beliefs and critical 
thinking, there are signifi cant diff erences of critical thinking scores between the 
relevant subgroups sorted by their belief justifi cation (infl exible vs. sophisticat-
ed): We expect students that argue sophisticatedly in the beliefs questionnaire to 
score higher in the critical thinking test than students that argue infl exibly.
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4.  Methods
4.1  Participants
Becoming a teacher in Germany requires an education at a university and this edu-
cation depends on the type of school the future teacher aspires to teach at. The ed-
ucation to become a teacher at primary schools (Grundschule, grade 1–4) or low-
er secondary schools (Hauptschule and Realschule, grade 5–10) usually takes eight 
to ten semesters and comprises basic level mathematics courses (arithmetic, alge-
bra, geometry). Becoming a teacher at upper secondary schools (Gymnasium, grade 
5–13) usually takes ten semesters and requires higher level mathematics cours-
es (analysis, linear algebra) but less educational courses compared to primary and 
lower secondary schools.
We present the results of a study with n = 463 pre-service teachers from 
two universities (University of Education, Freiburg, n = 277 and University of 
Duisburg-Essen, n = 186). The students that aspire to teach at primary schools 
(n = 198) are all enrolled at the University of Education in Freiburg; the stu-
dents for upper secondary schools (n = 105) are all enrolled at the University of 
Duisburg-Essen; the students for lower secondary schools (n = 160) are enrolled 
either at the university in Freiburg (n = 79) or in Essen (n = 81). All these students 
participated voluntarily in this study within the fi rst week of the 2014/15 winter 
term. They were contacted within lectures and were asked to complete the assess-
ment within the lecture time. 
4.2  Instruments
In this study, we identify (a) pre-service mathematics teachers’ epistemological be-
liefs, and (b) their mathematical critical thinking and examine relationships be-
tween both constructs. Based on qualitative and quantitative preliminary studies 
(Rott et al., 2014, 2015), according tests and questionnaires with closed and open 
items have been developed.
4.2.1  Epistemological beliefs and their degree of justifi cation
In the study at hand, we focus on denotative beliefs, i.e., explicitly stated and re-
fl ected beliefs instead of connotative beliefs which are aff ective and associative (cf. 
Stahl & Bromme, 2007). To gain access to denotative epistemological beliefs and to 
the justifi cation of the students’ judgments, we constructed a questionnaire based 
on a preliminary interview study (Rott et al., 2014). The interviewees’ answers re-
vealed a broad spectrum of possible responses that helped us to construct accord-
ing items for a quantitative test. In the resulting questionnaire, we use open-ended 
questions and prompts (see Table 1) explaining controversial points of view to-
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wards mathematics as a scientifi c discipline to acquire a vivid account of our par-
ticipants’ epistemological judgments and according arguments.
Table 1:  Prompts and questions in the questionnaire regarding the certainty of mathema-
tical knowledge
Mathematical Knowledge is Certain Mathematical Knowledge is Uncertain
“In mathematics, knowledge is valid forever. A 
theorem is never incorrect. In contrast to all other sci-
ences, knowledge is accumulated in mathematics. […] 
It is impossible, that a theorem that was proven cor-
rectly will be wrong from a future point of view. Each 
theorem is for eternity.”
(Albrecht Beutelspacher, 2001, p. 235; translated by 
the fi rst author)
“The issue is […] whether mathematicians can 
always be absolutely confi dent of the truth of 
certain complex mathematical results […].
With regard to some very complex issues, truth 
in mathematics is that for which the vast major-
ity of the community believes it has compelling 
arguments. And such truth may be fallible.
Serious mistakes are relatively rare, of course.”
(Alan H. Schoenfeld,1994, p. 58 f.)
a) Which of the two positions regarding the certainty of mathematical knowledge can you identify your-
self with?
b) Please, give reasons for your judgment regarding the certainty/uncertainty of mathematical knowl-
edge.
c) Did you yourself make experiences that support one position or the other?
d) Compare the certainty of mathematical knowledge to that of knowledge from other domains. For 
example, is mathematical more or less certain than knowledge from physics, language sciences or 
educational sciences?
We developed a coding manual for the belief position (mathematical knowledge as 
certain vs. uncertain) and the level of belief justifi cation (as infl exible vs. sophis-
ticated). Each student’s response to the four questions (a–d) in the questionnaire 
has been considered as one text and rated individually by two raters. These texts 
were analyzed with respect to the belief position and the arguments used to back 
up this position. A text was rated as “sophisticated” when it included arguments 
that refl ected epistemological aspects related to the certainty of mathematical 
knowledge (e.g., referring to mathematical axioms, rigorous proofs, or peer-review) 
instead of just referring to personal opinions or knockout arguments (without an 
explanation for the validity of the argument). The length of an answer was not a 
criterion for this decision. See Table 2 for examples of the four possible outcomes 
of the rating of students’ responses.
Table 3 shows the resulting interrater reliability; minor discrepancies occurred 
only when students wrote very short answers. Overall, the reliability score shows 
very high agreement (Cohen’s ĸ = 0.865). After calculating the interrater reliability, 
the diff ering codes have been rated consensually by the two raters. The consensual 
ratings can be seen in Table 5.
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Table 2:  Examples for the students’ responses in the open-ended belief questionnaire
Infl exible Sophisticated
Certain
“Mathematical knowledge 
is certain. Mathematical 
objects like numbers will 
never change.” (SBLP-25)
“Mathematical knowledge is certain, because it is not based 
on observations and on theses based on these observations. 
Instead, mathematical knowledge is based on conventions 
(axioms) and resulting theorems. There may be diff erences 
regarding these conventions but not the conclusions.” 
(ESEB-16)
Uncertain
“Mathematical knowledge 
is uncertain, because argu-
ments can be rebutted.” 
(LAAI-21)
“Mathematical knowledge is uncertain. A proof is only valid, 
because a majority of humans considers it and the according 
arguments as valid. Without this approval, it would not be 
valid anymore. Therefore, the certainty of a proof depends 
on the judgment of humans and this is not safe.” (BJAT-16)
Table 3:  Calculation of the interrater reliability coding “Certainty of Mathematical 
Knowledge”
Rater 1
Certain & 
infl exible
Certain & 
sophisti-
cated
Uncertain & 
infl exible
Uncertain & 
sophisti-
cated
Sum
Rater 2
Certain & 
infl exible 203   0 25   1 229
Certain & 
sophisticated    0 17  0  0  17
Uncertain & 
infl exible   0  0 192  5 197
Uncertain & 
sophisticated   0  0 5 15  20
Sum 203 17 222 21 463
Pobs = 0.922, Pexp = 0.424, Cohen’s ĸ = 0.865
4.2.2  Measuring mathematical critical thinking
In order to measure mathematical critical thinking as described above, more than 
20 items similar to and including the bat-and-ball task have been constructed or 
adapted. A second example is the following task: “In a gamble, a regular six-sided 
die with four green faces and two red faces is rolled 20 times. You win €25 if a cer-
tain sequence of results is shown. Which sequence would you bet on? Choose one: 
(a) RGRRR (b) GRGRRR (c) GRRRRR.” Most students choose option (b) because 
it contains more instances of G than the other options. Those students do not re-
alize that option (a) is entirely included in option (b) and, therefore, more likely.
All items were related to mathematical situations and demanded only knowl-
edge from lower secondary education. In four preliminary studies – of which three 
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were quantitative studies and one was a qualitative study using task-based inter-
views – (Rott & Leuders, 2016), it was investigated whether the items measure 
computational skills or the willingness to engage in a critical refl ection of appar-
ently obvious solutions. Items that did not trigger critical thinking according to the 
model by Stanovich and Stanovich were discarded. After validation and because we 
wanted to restrict the time for this test to 20 minutes, the fi nal test consisted of 11 
items (for further details see Rott et al., 2015).
All items were rated dichotomously and we used a Rasch model to transform 
our participants’ test scores into values on a one-dimensional competency scale 
(software RUMM 2030 by Andrich, Sheridan, & Luo, 2009). After eliminating two 
items because of underdiscrimination (fi t residual > 2.5) in connection with fl oor 
and ceiling eff ects, respectively, for each item the model showed good fi t residu-
als (all values between -2.5 and 2.5) and no signifi cant diff erences between the 
observed overall performance of each trait group and its expected performance 
(overall-χ² = 36.2; df = 27; p = 0.11).
5.  Results
Firstly, we present the distribution of the pre-service teachers’ responses regard-
ing the questionnaire on epistemological beliefs. Secondly, we evaluate our partic-
ipants’ scores on the test of mathematical critical thinking. Thirdly, we investigate 
possible relations between both aspects of mathematics-related research compe-
tency.
5.1  Denotative beliefs: Position and justifi cation
The distribution of students that fi lled out the belief questionnaire is presented in 
Table 4. The data is sorted by the four possible outcomes of the two belief dimen-
sions (belief position combined with the degree of justifi cation). Additionally, the 
students’ distribution has been sorted by their number of semesters (into novice 
students with three or less semesters and into advanced students with four or more 
semesters respectively, this also happens to be a median split) as well as by their 
aspired teaching profession (primary, lower secondary, or upper secondary school). 
The last row shows the total number of students in each of the four belief catego-
ries. The low percentage of students arguing sophisticatedly (8.2  %) is in line with 
the respective percentage of students (12.9  %) in the preliminary quantitative study 
(Rott et al., 2015).
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Table 4:  Distribution of the students’ denotative epistemological beliefs and their degree 
of justifi cation
Certain & 
infl exible
Certain & 
sophisti-
cated
Uncertain 
& infl exible
Uncertain 
& sophisti-
cated
Sum
Semester ≤ 3 117 (47.4%) 6 (2.4%) 114 (46.2%) 10 (4.0%) 247 (100%)
Semester ≥ 4 86 (39.8%) 11 (5.1%) 108 (50.0%) 11 (5.1%) 216 (100%)
Primary 84 (42.4%) 5 (2.5%) 97 (49.0%) 12 (6.1%) 198 (100%)
Lower Secondary 67 (41.9%) 4 (2.5%) 85 (53.1%) 4 (2.5%) 160 (100%)
Upper Secondary 52 (49.5%) 8 (7.6%) 40 (38.1%) 5 (4.8%) 105 (100%)
All students combined 203 (43.8%) 17 (3.7%) 222 (47.9%) 21 (4.5%) 463 (100%)
Chi-square tests were used to address the question whether the two theoretical-
ly claimed dimensions (belief position and according justifi cation, cf. H1) are inde-
pendent. Table 5 presents the set-up of the data for the chi-square test for all stu-
dents which are the same numbers as in the last row of Table 4 (Yates chi-square 
test, corrected for continuity: χ² = 0.04, df = 1, p = 0.842).
Table 5:  Comparison of both dimensions of the belief questionnaire for all students; the 
numbers in brackets indicate expected frequency under the assumption of statis-
tical independence
Infl exible Sophisticated Sum
Certain 203 (201.9) 17 (18.1) 220
Uncertain 222 (223.1) 21 (19.9) 243
Sum 425 38 463
χ² = 0.04 df = 1 p = 0.842
The chi-square test has also been repeated for all sub-groups to check for possi-
ble group specifi c dependencies (Semester ≤ 3: χ² = 0.58, p = 0.446; Semester ≥ 4: 
χ² = 0.08, p = 0.777; Primary schools: χ² = 1.19, p = 0.275; Lower secondary 
schools: χ² = 0.001, p = 0.975 (numbers too small for exact results); Upper sec-
ondary schools: χ² = 0.002, p = 0.964; all df = 1). These results confi rm our hy-
pothesis 1 that both dimensions are statistically independent. Therefore, in Table 6 
we sort the numbers of students by those two dimensions separately.
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Table 6:  Distribution of the students’ denotative epistemological beliefs and their degree 
of justifi cation
Certain Uncertain Infl exible Sophisticated Total
Semester ≤ 3 123 (49.8%) 124 (50.2%) 231 (93.5%) 16 (6.5%) 247 (100%)
Semester ≥ 4 97 (44.9%) 119 (55.1%) 194 (89.8%) 22 (10.2%) 216 (100%)
Primary 89 (44.9%) 109 (55.1%) 181 (91.4%) 17 (8.6%) 198 (100%)
Lower secondary 71 (44.4%) 89 (55.6%) 152 (95.0%) 8 (5.0%) 160 (100%)
Upper secondary 60 (57.1%) 45 (42.9%) 92 (87.6%) 13 (12.4%) 105 (100%)
All students combined 220 (47.5%) 243 (52.5%) 425 (91.8%) 38 (8.2%) 463 (100%)
A fi rst question regarding these data concerns the pre-service teachers’ judg-
ments: Do they regard mathematical knowledge as certain or uncertain and does 
this change with the number of semesters (cf. H2)? The ratio of pre-service teach-
ers judging “certain” in semester 3 or less is 123 : 124 (49.8  % certain) compared 
to 97 : 119 (44.9  %) in semester 4 or higher; there is no signifi cant deviation from 
the null-hypothesis (“no eff ect”) (Yates chi-square test, corrected for continuity: 
χ² = 0.92, df = 1, p = 0.338).
This question can be repeated for each sub-group. For pre-service teachers of 
primary schools, there is no signifi cant diff erence in the judgment of mathemat-
ical knowledge as “certain” in semester 3 or less (42 : 43, 49.4  % certain) com-
pared to students in semester 4 or higher (47 : 66, 41.6  % certain) (χ² = 0.90, 
df = 1, p = 0.343). There is also no signifi cant diff erence for pre-service teachers 
of lower secondary schools in semester 3 or less (51 : 69, 42.5  % certain) compared 
to students in semester 4 or higher (20 : 20, 50.0  % certain) (χ² = 0.41, df = 1, 
p = 0.522). There is, however, a signifi cant diff erence for pre-service teachers of 
upper secondary schools in semester 3 or less (30 : 12, 71.4  % certain) compared 
to students in semester 4 or higher (30 : 33, 47.6  % certain) (χ² = 4.90, df = 1, 
p = 0.027). Except for the pre-service teachers that aspire to teach at upper sec-
ondary schools, there are no diff erences within the subgroups which is in accor-
dance with hypothesis 2. 
A second question concerns the participants’ justifi cation: Do they argue infl ex-
ibly or sophisticatedly and does the belief justifi cation diff er between the relevant 
subgroups (number of semesters and educational program, cf. H3)? The number 
of sophisticated reasoning is higher for students with a higher number of semes-
ters than for students with a lower number of semesters, which is 194 : 22 (in-
fl exible : sophisticated, i.e. 10.2  % sophisticated) (semester ≥ 4) in comparison to 
231 : 16 (6.5  %) (semester ≤ 3).
A closer inspection of the sub-groups shows that this eff ect is not visible in pri-
mary students: A larger percentage of students of semester 3 or less (76 : 9, 10.6  % 
sophisticated) argues sophisticatedly compared to students of semester 4 or high-
er (105 : 8, 7.1  % sophisticated). The eff ect is visible, though, for the other two 
sub-groups: Pre-service teachers of lower secondary schools in semester 3 or less 
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(117 : 3, 2.5  % sophisticated) show less sophisticated statements compared to stu-
dents in semester 4 or higher (35 : 5, 12.5  % sophisticated). Pre-service teachers 
of upper secondary schools in semester 3 or less (38 : 4, 9.5  % sophisticated) also 
show less sophisticated belief justifi cations compared to students in semester 4 
or higher (54 : 9, 14.3  % sophisticated). Except for the primary school pre-service 
teachers, the slow shift towards more sophisticated belief justifi cation is in accor-
dance with hypothesis 3.
A closer look at the students in the diff erent educational programs confi rms 
the hypothesis, that a higher percentage of students that aspire to become second-
ary teachers argue sophisticatedly than students for lower secondary and primary 
schools (12.5  % compared to 5.0  % and 8.6  %, respectively).
5.2  Critical thinking
The Rasch model of the students’ critical thinking ability provides metrical la-
tent variables ranging from -2.83 to 2.81 with low values indicating a low ability. 
Table 7 presents the means of these values that have been sorted by aspired type of 
school and by the number of semesters (cf. Rott et al., 2015).
A t-test was used to compare the two groups that aspire to teach at lower sec-
ondary schools (Freiburg: -0.222 (0.864), n = 79; Essen: -0.255 (1.047), n = 81). 
The test showed no signifi cant diff erences between these two groups (t = 0.22, 
df = 158, ptwo-tailed = 0.826), so that we also combined these two groups in our ana-
lyses when necessary.
Table 7:  Means (and standard deviations) of Mathematical Critical Thinking, sorted by 
aspired teaching position (crossing universities) and the number of semesters
Semester ≤ 3 Semester ≥ 4 Total
Primary 0.031 (0.872) -0.369 (0.915) -0.197 (0.916)
n = 85 n = 113 n = 198
Lower secondary -0.235 (0.868) -0.252 (1.202) -0.239 (0.958)
n = 120 n = 40 n = 160
Upper secondary -0.117 (0.907) 0.354 (0.995) 0.166 (0.984)
n = 42 n = 63 n = 105
Total -0.123 (0.881) -0.136 (1.041) -0.129 (0.958)
n = 247 n = 216 n = 463
A question that can be addressed to these data is whether critical thinking 
scores are dependent on the semester and the aspired teaching position (cf. H4). 
Surprisingly, there is no signifi cant advantage in the critical thinking scores for stu-
dents with a higher number of semesters which could be assumed (and was visible 
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in the preliminary study). Actually, the three study programs show very diff erent 
results regarding the development of critical thinking within this pseudo-longitu-
dinal survey: Only in the group of students aspiring to teach at upper secondary 
schools, the more experienced students show signifi cantly higher critical thinking 
scores (t-test: t = 2.46, df = 103, p2-sided = 0,016; d = 0.48). For lower secondary 
schools, there is no signifi cant diff erence (t = 0.1, df = 158, p2-sided = 0,921), and for 
primary schools, there is even a decline (t = 3.1, df = 196, p2-sided = 0,002; d = 0.44). 
Therefore, it is not recommendable to interpret the results of a two-way ANOVA 
that has been used to investigate whether there are diff erences between students 
of semester three or less compared to students of semester four or greater, and 
whether there are diff erences between students of the diff erent study programs.
The part of hypothesis 4 regarding higher critical thinking scores for students 
with a higher number of semesters can therefore not be confi rmed. The critical 
thinking scores regarding the aspired teaching position, however, indicate that stu-
dents show higher scores in the mathematical critical thinking test, if they have the 
more profound mathematics education (upper secondary vs. lower secondary and 
primary education).
5.3  The relation of epistemological beliefs and critical thinking
Table 8 presents mean values of critical thinking scores in relation to the students’ 
answers on the epistemological belief questionnaire; the numbers of students are 
identical to those in Table 6.
Table 8:  Means (and standard deviations) of Mathematical Critical Thinking, sorted by 
the dimensions of the belief questionnaire
Certain Uncertain Infl exible Sophisticated Total
Semester ≤ 3 -0.125 (0.866) -0.121 (0.898) -0.163 (0.858) 0.451 (1.029) -0.123 (0.881)
n = 123 n = 124 n = 231 n = 16 n = 247
Semester ≥ 4 -0.076 (1.089) -0.185 (1.003) -0.195 (1.026) 0.384 (1.052) -0.136 (1.041)
n = 97 n = 119 n = 194 n = 22 n = 216
Primary -0.129 (0.921) -0.253 (0.913) -0.239 (0.889) 0.245 (1.103) -0.197 (0.916)
n = 89 n = 109 n = 181 n = 17 n = 198
Lower 
secondary 
-0.397 (1.036) -0.113 (0.877) -0.271 (0.936) 0.370 (1.235) -0.239 (0.958)
n = 71 n = 89 n = 152 n = 8 n = 160
Upper 
secondary
0.282 (0.832) 0.011 (1.148) 0.096 (0.991) 0.656 (0.803) 0.166 (0.984)
n = 60 n = 45 n = 92 n = 13 n = 105
All students 
combined
-0.104 (0.969) -0.153 (0.949) -0.178 (0.938) 0.412 (1.029) -0.129 (0.958)
n = 220 n = 243 n = 425 n = 38 n = 463
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A fi rst question that can be addressed to these data is whether critical thinking 
scores depend on the belief position (“certain” vs. “uncertain”) (cf. H5). A two-way 
ANOVA has been used to answer this question: There are no signifi cant diff erenc-
es between students regarding mathematical knowledge as “certain” compared to 
students regarding it as “uncertain” (F = .159; p = .690). There are signifi cant dif-
ferences between students of the diff erent study programs (see above) (F = 6.200; 
p = .002); a Tukey Post-Hoc reveals that the diff erences between the study pro-
grams are signifi cant between primary and upper secondary (p = .002) as well as 
between lower and upper secondary (p = .004), but not between primary and low-
er secondary (p = .907) education. Also, there is a signifi cant interaction eff ect 
(F = 3.263; p = .039). The results regarding the study programs and the interac-
tion eff ect have to be interpreted carefully because of the disordinal interaction be-
tween study program and number of semesters (see above). Nonetheless, these re-
sults confi rm our hypothesis 5 that critical thinking scores are not related to the 
belief position (certain vs. uncertain).
The second question in this context addresses the correlation of critical thinking 
scores with the degree of belief justifi cation (cf. H6). Another ANOVA shows that 
students that argue sophisticatedly score signifi cantly better than students that ar-
gue in an infl exible way (F = 11.386; p = .001; d = 0.62; observed statistical power 
of this eff ect is 96.1  %). A closer look at the data shows that the signifi cant diff er-
ences for the belief justifi cation are true for all three subgroups of aspired teaching 
positions (see also Table 7). Thus, the results confi rm our hypothesis 6 that there is 
a marked connection between justifi cation of beliefs and the ability of thinking crit-
ically when solving tasks.
6.  Discussion
6.1  Discussion of the hypotheses
In the study at hand, most of the hypotheses that were drawn from the preliminary 
study (Rott et al., 2015) could be confi rmed.
H1, the assumed independence of belief position and justifi cation, has been 
confi rmed for the whole test population as well as for each sub-group (pre-service 
teachers with a lower and higher number of semesters as well as for each of the 
three aspired school types). This result is particularly important for research on 
epistemological beliefs since within closed questionnaire surveys the belief position 
is often used to determine its level of justifi cation. For example, Hofer and Pintrich 
(1997, p. 119 f.) assume that the belief “absolute truth exists with certainty” is valid 
only for “lower levels” of belief justifi cation (i.e., it is less sophisticated). Our study 
shows that the belief position of certainty can be held and supported also with so-
phisticated arguments – at least in the area under investigation. Further areas re-
main to be investigated to corroborate the assumption of independence.
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H2 stated that there are no signifi cant diff erences regarding belief position 
within the sub-groups (low or high number of semesters and educational programs 
at the universities). This hypothesis was confi rmed except for the group of upper 
secondary pre-service teachers. We can only speculate on possible reasons of the 
change within this group. It might be due to the strong mathematics-related con-
tent and experiences of fl awed proofs of these students’ education that favors a 
shift to uncertainty beliefs. However, we conducted no genuine longitudinal survey 
and are unable to capture actual changes in students’ beliefs.
H3 predicted diff erences within the sub-groups regarding the belief justifi ca-
tion. This hypothesis was confi rmed except for the group of primary pre-service 
teachers. Older students should be better able to argue sophisticatedly against a 
richer backdrop of knowledge and experience, which has become evident in the 
data. Also, students with a richer mathematical background (trainees for upper 
secondary schools) showed a higher percentage of sophisticated justifi cation. We 
do not know, however, what happened in the sample of pre-service teachers for 
primary schools.
H4, the assumed increase in critical thinking scores between the students from 
lower and higher semesters could not be confi rmed; but it was confi rmed for the 
diff erent educational programs. The unexpected stagnation with respect to critical 
thinking in some of the groups may be investigated further with respect to possi-
ble group substructures. A reason for this could be anything from a bad day that 
infl uenced test results for that specifi c day to lectures that sustainably aff ected the 
willingness to think critically of some participants. However the present data does 
not allow for such a further investigation. One may argue that the tasks used in the 
critical thinking test do not require mathematics that are taught at the university 
level and should therefore not depend on the number of semesters.
H5 and H6, predicting no relations between belief position and mathemat-
ical competency (operationalized by our critical thinking test) but signifi cant re-
lations between belief justifi cation and mathematical competency could both be 
confi rmed. Picking up the discussion from H1, this result seems to be of high im-
portance. Studies trying to show connections between (epistemological) beliefs and 
other factors of (mathematical) competencies would be well advised to collect data 
regarding belief justifi cation not solely with instruments that operationalize it via 
belief positions. H5 and H6 also allow for hypotheses regarding the development 
of students’ competencies during their university education for subsequent studies.
6.2 Limitations
Due to our specifi c procedure the study has several limitations. 
Firstly, some considerations with respect to the validity of the testing proce-
dures seem to be necessary: Within our study we assumed the perspective of dis-
tinguishing between beliefs in a dichotomous manner. This is partly inherent in the 
design (participants had to decide between two opposing statements) and partly 
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due to the evaluation methods (dichotomization of the multivariate data). Studies 
with experts (e.g., Mura, 1993) indicate that this approach becomes invalid, when 
the individuals have broad experience in their subject and hold complex and dif-
ferentiated views. For people that have reached a very high degree of justifi cation, 
such as professional mathematicians, the method of forced choice between two be-
lief positions (e.g., “certain” vs “uncertain”) may lead to invalidities, since such peo-
ple tend to answer that both positions can be adequate depending on the context 
(Stahl, 2011; Gowers, 2013). The interviews that were conducted in our preliminary 
qualitative study (Rott et al., 2014) confi rm these considerations: Highly sophisti-
cated interviewees refuse to commit themselves to one belief position. However, in 
those interviews (ibid.) it was found that for students such a dialectic position is 
not yet in reach and that deciding for one or the other belief position is not trigger-
ing irritations. Therefore, we consider the methodological decision to rate the stu-
dents’ belief positions dichotomously as reasonable for the study at hand.
As stated above, all diff erences regarding the number of the pre-service teach-
ers’ semester have to be interpreted with care as we did not conduct a longitudi-
nal survey. Within this study, we cannot trace the development of students’ episte-
mological beliefs in the course of their university studies. Furthermore, we cannot 
tell whether results in favor of students with more semesters are due to a gain in 
knowledge or to selection eff ects, i.e. low-performing students leaving the univer-
sity. To answer according questions, follow-up studies have to be conducted. For 
a validation it would be most desirable to use the instrument for investigating 
change of belief and critical thinking during specifi c learning environments.
Also the strands may be confounded with the location. Such considerations can 
be dealt with when we extend our investigations to more than only two universi-
ties.
6.3 Theoretical considerations with respect to epistemological 
beliefs and critical thinking
We do not off er a model that explains the justifi cation of beliefs and the level of 
critical thinking. Possibly we deal here with two quite diff erent constructs (one 
more verbal, the other more mathematical) that grow simultaneously. However, 
Kuhn (1999, p. 22 f.) discusses possible relationships between the development of 
epistemological beliefs and critical thinking. She argues that the transition from 
absolutistic to evaluativistic beliefs of the knowledge structure and the ability to 
think critically are closely related. On the one hand, critical refl ections lead to 
questioning beliefs and to the insight that even experts disagree about important 
issues. These are important steps in developing more sophisticated epistemological 
beliefs. On the other hand, an absolutist epistemological understanding favors easy 
and more direct answers on questions of truth or falsity. Kuhn concludes that indi-
viduals who confi ne themselves to an absolutist epistemology have a low demand 
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for critical thinking skills and, hence, the impetus to exercise and further develop 
these skills is slight.
The study presented here, is conducted in mathematics teacher education. 
However, we assume that the constructs presented here can also be found with re-
spect to other subjects, so that it would be interesting to ask whether similar fi nd-
ings would be encountered, for instance, in the education of science or history 
teachers. Still, the constructs would partly need diff erent operationalizations (e.g., 
for critical thinking) or a diff erent emphasis on epistemological aspects of the sub-
ject than those relevant for mathematics.
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